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1 Introduction 
According to the (neo) Russellian theory of definite descriptions [Russell, 1 905; 
Neale, 1990], a definite description combines an assertion of existence with an 
assertion of uniqueness. Thus, the sentence John met the student asserts that 
there is a student, that this student is unique, and John met bim/her. These truth 
conditions can be summarized as in (2). 
( 1 )  John met the student. 
(2) (3 x student(x) 1\ 01 y (student(y) � y = x)) 1\ met(j,x)) 
An alternative approach to the semantics of definite descriptions was proposed by 
Heim in her dissertation [ 1982] . In Heim's theory, definite and indefinite NPs are 
semantically equivalent, and both introduce free variables. The truth conditions 
proposed by Heim for ( 1 )  are as follows, where x is a variable. 
(3) student(x) 1\ met(j,x) 
Heim proposes that the difference between definites and indefinites is that (i) 
definites must be familiar in the context, and (ii) the restriction on a definite 
NP (the predicate student(x) in (3)) must be presupposed. These aspects of the 
meaning of definites and indefinites are captured by making reference to the notion 
of common ground, that Heim proposes to conceptualize in terms of the metaphor 
offile cards. Each indefinite NP in a discourse introducing the free variable x is 
conceptualized as adding a new card with index x to a file card set F that represents 
the common ground, and is augmented as the discourse proceeds. The difference 
between definites and indefinites is formulated in terms of file card indices, as 
specified by the following NoveltylFamiliarity Condition ([Heim, 1 982] , p. 370) : 
Novelty-Familiarity-Condition: 
For � to be felicitous w.r.t. a file F it is required for every NP x in � that: 
i. if NP", is [-definite] , then x ¢ Dom(F); 
ii. if NPx is [+definite] , then 
a. x E Dom(F), and 
b. if NP '" is a formula, F entails NP "' .  
Heim argues that the fact that definite descriptions typically refer uniquely is not 
an intrinsic semantic property, but a consequence of the fact that the listener, upon 
hearing a definite NP, has to identify a unique index for it among the file cards, 
which cannot be done unless there is only one 'appropriate' file card. 
© 1994 by Massimo Poesio 
Mandy Harvey and Lynn Same1mann (eds.), SALT lV 282-299, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University. 
Weak Definites 
In this paper I examine a class of definite descriptions that I will call weak 
de finites. One of my goals in doing so is to gain new insights concerning the 
conflict between the two semantic theories of definite descriptions just discussed. 
The data I will examine are exemplified by the sentences in (4) . 
(4) a. John got these data from the student of a linguist. 
b. The village is located on the side of a mountain. 
c. I usually had breakfast at the comer of a major intersection. 
Definite descriptions of the form [NP The N of NP[ -definite]] like the student of a 
linguist in (4a) are fairly common: (4b)-(4c) are not made up, but were found in 
existing texts. What's interesting about definites of this form is that they have a 
reading that is not predicted by either the Russellian theory of definite descriptions 
or Heim's theory. The reading of (4a) I am interested in can be paraphrased as: 
there is a linguist, and there is a student of that linguist, such that John got the data 
from that student. This reading can be tentatively characterized by the following 
expression. 
(5) (:3 y linguist(y) /\ (:3 x student-oj(x,y) /\ got(j,d,x))) 
Interpreting (4a) requires no familiarity with the student in question, either in 
the dictionary sense of familiarity or in Heim's technical sense. The examples 
could therefore be considered a counterexample to Heim's proposal. On the other 
hand, the truth conditions of (4a) under this interpretation are not immediately 
explainable under a Russellian account. Furthermore, although there are several 
ways in which one may try to capture the interpretation in (5) within a Russellian 
framework, none of them works very well. Clearly, (4a) does not require the 
universe of interpretation to include a single individual that can be characterized 
as the student of a linguist. One might try to rescue the Russellian proposal by 
taking (4a) to be a case of domain selection, adopting the suggestions of, e.g., 
Lewis [Lewis, 1 979] and Kadmon [ 1 9871 One might claim, that is, that (4a) 
should be interpreted as The unique SALIENT student of a linguist gave John these 
data. Let me just remark, for the moment, that this proposal fails to characterize 
the distinction between the definite in (4a) and the definites in (6), all of which do 
seem to require a student to be particularly salient in order to be felicitous. I will 
return to this way of rescuing the Russellian approach later on. 
(6) a. John got these data from the student. 
b. John got these data from the student who studies with a linguist. 
c .  John got these data from the student with a brown jacket. 
Another way of reconciling the examples in (4) with the RusselIian treatment of 
definites would be to propose that the reading of the student of a linguist in (5) is a 
case of inverse linking in the sense of May [ 1985] , i .e. ,  that the indefinite NP takes 
wide scope over the definite. This would enable us to maintain the translation 
of the definite a quantifier entailing uniqueness However, (4b) and (4c) clearly 
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indicate that this proposal is not correct: otherwise, (4c) could never be true, since 
major intersections typically have four corners. 
The class of definites in (4) are interesting not only because they represent a 
difficulty for the two major theories of definite descriptions, but also because they 
call into discussion certain generalizations about there-sentences [Milsark, 1977 ; 
Barwise and Cooper, 1 98 1 ;  Reuland and ter Meulen, 1987]. These hypotheses are 
motivated by the contrast in (7) . 
(7) a. There is a student in the garden. 
b. *There is { him/John/the student/every student } in the garden. 
These examples have been taken to indicate that indefinite NPs such as a student can 
occur in postverbal position in there-sentences, whereas pronouns, proper names, 
definites and quantified NPs such as every student cannot. This generalization 
is usually called the Definiteness Restriction [Reuland and ter Meulen, 1987] . 
Milsark introduced the terms strong NP to refer to NPs that cannot occur in 
postverbal position, and weak NPs to refer to NPs that can occur in that position. 
Definite descriptions are typically classified as strong NPs, on the basis of (7b) ; 
consider however (8). 
(8) ( ?)There is the student of a linguist in the garden. 
Most of my informants find (8a) acceptable or, at least, much better than any of 
the sentences in (7b). This suggests that definite descriptions such as the student 
of a linguist should be classified as weak NPs: hence, the name weak definites for 
the definite descriptions in this class . 
2 First Hypothesis, Some Assumptions 
Only definites of the form [NPI the N1 of [NP2 D N2J] ,  where NP2 is indefinite, 
have the interpretation 1 discussed above. None of the definites in (6) (repeated 
below) does. 1 
(6) a. John got these data from the student. 
b. John got these data from the student who studies with a linguist. 
c. John got these data from the student with a brown jacket. 
One might perhaps try to account for the contrast between the examples in (4) 
and the examples in (6) by hypothesizing that definites are ambiguous between an 
'existential' and a 'classical' (i.e., Russellian) reading. This hypothesis runs into 
problems pretty quickly, however. Weak definites are not simply 'existentials in 
disguise' .  (9a) (below) cannot be paraphrased as (9b), that is not fully gramma­
tical. And anyway, (9c) is not the preferred paraphrase of (9a) : the appropriate 
paraphrase is (9d) . The weak definite the student of any linguist in (9a), in other 
words, has the same force of the free-choice any binding linguist. The same argu­
ment applies, mutatis mutandis, to (ge), an example of negative polarity any.2 (I 
owe both these examples and their analysis to Roberto Zamparelli, p.c.) 
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(9) a. The student of any linguist should be able to solve this ! 
b. ?? A student of any linguist should be able to solve this ! 
c .  For any linguist, at least one of his students should be able to solve 
this. 
d. Take any linguist, and any student of that linguist; that student should 
be able to solve this. 
e .  I don't think that the student of any linguist could solve this. 
In order to accomodate the preferred reading of that sentence, one would have 
to claim that definites are three ways ambiguous: besides a 'classical' and an 
'existential' reading, they also have a 'free-choice' reading, and possibly also 
a 'negative polarity' reading (although that reading could be equivalent to the 
'existential' one). Furthermore, examples like ( 10) indicate that weak definites 
have the force of the complement indefinite not only when the indefinite has 
existential force, but also when it gets bound by an unselective operator and 
acquires universal force: 
( 10) If the student of a linguist owns a donkey, he beats it. 
A different solution comes to mind, namely, that the reason why weak definites 
have the interpretation we are interested in is because their interpretation gets 
'anchored' to that of the NP that serves as complement of of, so that if that 
NP gets bound by an operator, these definites get bound by that operator as 
well. When combined with a treatment of definites and indefinites along the 
lines of Heim's proposal, this hypothesis would explain the different strength of 
the weak: definites in (4) and in ( 10) . Combined with a story about any similar to 
that proposed by Kadmon and Landman [ 1993] , according to which any-NPs are 
essentially indefinites with additional semantic semantic/pragmatic characteristics, 
this hypothesis would also explain the variation in semantic force between the weak: 
definite the student of a linguist and the weak: definite the student of any linguist, 
as well as the different readings acquired by the latter when the complement NP 
any linguist is interpreted as free choice or as polarity sensitive. 
This 'anchoring' process has two crucial properties. First of all, it occurs only 
when the definite NP is modified by an of-clause; none of the definites in (6) has 
the 'weak:' interpretation. Secondly, this 'anchoring' results in a weak definite 
only when the complement itself is a weak: NP; when the complement NP is strong, 
as in the king of France or the student of Chomsky, the definite is also strong. The 
reading we are interested in is in fact not available when the complement of of is 
a strong NP, as shown by the fact that the definites in ( 1 1 ) are all required to be 
familiar, and by the fact that in none of the variants of (8) in ( 1 2) is grammatical :  
( 1 1 ) a. John got these data from the student of every linguist. 
b. John got these data from the student of Chomsky. 
( 1 2) *There is the student of { Chomsky/every linguist/the linguist } in the 
garden. 
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In other words, it looks like the ' strength' of the definite depends on what it gets 
' anchored' to. 
This suggests that the ' strength' of definites may not be an intrinsic (syntactic 
or semantic) feature. In fact, I 'm going to suggest that the aspect of a definite's 
interpretation that makes it 'strong' may get 'canceled' in certain circumstances 
before this ' strength' is tested; weak definites, in other words, satisfy the Defini­
teness Restriction because their strength has been 'canceled' . This 'canceling' is 
the result of their value being made dependent on the value of the complement NP 
in the of-clause; other forms of nominal modification do not result in such a de­
pendency being established, and the canceling only takes place if the complement 
is not itself ' strong' . 
In order to make the comparison of the proposed treatment of definiteness 
and the Definite Restriction as close as possible to related proposals such as 
Heim's and [Barker, 1 99 1 ] , I will adopt here the same theoretical framework. 
In particular, I will assume that the interface between syntax and semantics is a 
level of representation called Logical Form (LF) which results by the application 
of Quantifier Raising to s-structure, and that the Definiteness Restriction is a 
constraint on this level of representation.3 
3 Strong NPs, Contextual Dependency, and Para­
meters 
De Jong [ I 987] and, more recently, Zucchi [ 1 993] have argued that the key property 
distinguishing an NP that can occur in there-sentences from an NPs that cannot is 
presuppositionality. De Jong observes ( [ 1987], p. 276) that the class of NPs that 
cannot occur in there-sentences coincides with the class of NPs that have a partial 
interpretation; thus, a quantified NP that has a denotation only in models in which 
the denotation of the noun is not the empty set cannot occur in there-sentences. 
Zucchi [ 1 993] proposes the following (and equivalent) condition (p. 14): 
Presuppositional Characterization of Strong NPs NPs barred from postverbal 
position of there-sentences, unlike NPs allowed in this position, presuppose 
that the set denoted by N is nonempty. 
As shown by de Jong and Zucchi, the presuppositional characterization of strong 
NPs correctly identifies the NPs in (7a) as weak, and all the NPs in (7b) as 
strong. I will not discuss here the reason why the presuppositionality of an NP 
should affect its ability to occur in postverbal position in these sentences; both 
issues are discussed in some detail in [Zucchi, 1993] . What's interesting in this 
characterization of what it means for an NP to be strong, for my purposes, is that it 
suggests that the 'cancellation' of the ' strength' of an NP discussed in the previous 
section may tum out to be a case of presupposition cancellation [Gazdar, 1 979; 
Heim, 1 983] . 
Weak Definites 
If we assume with Heim [ 1987] that LF is the level at which the Definiteness 
Restriction is checked, then the presuppositional (or non-presuppositional) nature 
of an NP should be captured by its LF representation. Heim [ 1 983] argued that 
a sentence's presuppositions are essentially constraints imposed by that sentence 
on the contexts in which it may occur. Thus, Heim's definition of presupposition 
( [Heim, 1 983] , p. 1 17) is as follows: 
( 1 3) S presupposes p iff all contexts that admit S entail p. 
Van der Sandt [ 1990] , building on Heim's account, argues that talking of 'presup­
position cancellation' is miguided, and that 'cancellation' really is nothing else 
but a case of anaphora. For example, the reason why ( 14) does not presuppose the 
existence of a king of France is because the antecedent of the conditional modifies 
the context in which the consequent is evaluated creating a context that entails the 
existence of a king of France, thus satisfying the definition in ( 1 3 ) :  
( 1 4) If there i s  a king of  France, the king of France i s  bald. 
This suggests that the presuppositional nature of an NP is represented at LF in the 
same way that other forms of context -dependency are. In a lot of recent work 
'contextual variables'  have been used as a way to represent context dependency. 
Such variables have been used by Rooth in [ 1992] to restrict the set of properties 
that focus-sensitive particles quantify over, and by Hinrichs [ 1 988] to capture 
domain selection. As well, the idea of having context-dependent variables as 
part of the interpretation of a sentence is closely related to the idea developed in 
Situation Semantics that the meaning of a sentence may contain parameters. In 
Situation Semantics, a parameter represents a 'hole' to be filled by context. The 
notion of parameter was proposed in [Barwise and Perry, 1983] and extensively 
used by Gawron and Peters [ 1990] to specify the meaning of quantifiers and 
anaphoric expressions. 
I propose, first of all, that constituents indicating that the interpretation of a 
lexical item is context-dependent occur at LF; I will adopt Situation Semantics' 
terminology and call these LF constituents parameters. The effect of parameters 
is to make an LF subject to the following felicity condition: 
Condition on Parametric LFs In order for the interpretation of a sentence spe­
cified by Logical Form l to be felicitous, context must provide values of the 
appropriate type for all the parameters occurring in l. i.e., if Xl , . . .  , Xn are 
the parameters in l (I use capital letters to indicate parameters throughout) , 
a value can only be assigned to l relative to an assignment of values YI , . . . , 
Yn to the parameters of l, where Yl > . . .  , Yn are indices of file cards. 
Next, I propose to implement de Jong's and Zucchi's hypothesis about the connec­
tion between strong NPs and presuppositionality by defining a strong NP as an 
NP whose LF representation contains one or more parameters. The Definiteness 
Restriction becomes then a restriction on the occurrence of parameters at LF: 
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Definiteness Restriction : * [There V[ +be] NP[X] { PP } ]  
The meaning of this definition is as follows: an LF configuration o f  the form 
[There V[+be] NP[X] {PP } ] ,  where NP[X] is an NP whose interpretation depends 
on the value of the parameter X, is ungrammatical. 
Let me explain now how the occurrence of parameters at LF characterizes the 
presuppositional aspects of the interpretation of a strong NP. Pronouns are the 
prototypical context-dependent NP, and they are also very clearly strong NPs, as 
shown by the clear ungrammaticality of sentences such as *There is him in the 
garden. 1 propose that pronouns are 'essentially context dependent,' in the sense 
that their LF representation consists of just a parameter. For example, he translates 
as X, where X is a parameter, and *There is him in the garden. has the folowing 
LF representation: 
( 1 5) [There is X in the garden] 
(I am leaving the specification of the translation of the definite for later) . ( 15) is 
ruled ungrammatical by the Definiteness Restriction presented above. 
The presuppositional aspect of the interpretation of strong quantifiers is their 
domain of quantification, i.e., the set of objects that are chosen to evaluate the truth 
of a quantified assertion. It is well-known that sentence ( 1 6) can be truthfully used 
to describe a situation in which only a contextually determined subset of the set of 
all individuals (say, all the individuals in a particular room) was asleep, whereas 
others-for example, the speaker-were awake [Partee, 199 1 ] . 
( 1 6) Everybody was asleep. 
There are several ways one could use parameters to represent the fact that the 
domain of quantification has to be identified. The question one has to consider 
is, what is it that the context has to provide in order for a listener to be able to 
interpret a sentence such as ( 1 6)? One hypothesis that immediately comes to mind 
is that what has to be identified in interpreting ( 1 6) is a set of people, i.e., that the 
LF for ( 16) includes either a parameter X that stands for the subset of persons to 
be quantified over, as in ( 17a), or, equivalently, a parameter C that indicates that 
what has to be identified is a property, as in ( 17b) . 
( 1 7) a. [[every x person(x) J\ x E X] [asleep(x)] ]  
b. [[every x person(x) J\ C(X)] [asleep(x)]] 
An alternative-and, 1 will argue, more fruitful-way of thinking about what 
goes on in domain restriction is suggested by En�'s treatment of tense and NPs 
in [En9, 1986] . En9 observes that treatments of tense based either on Priorean 
operators (as in Montague Grammar) or on existential quantification over times 
(as in Dowty's system [ 1979]) fail to capture all of the readings of sentences such 
as ( 1 8). There is no way, for example, to capture the reading according to which 
for all past, present, or future rich men there is a point in their past at which they 
were obnoxious children. 
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( 1 8) All rich men were obnoxious children. 
En9 argues that the only way to generate all the readings of sentences like ( 1 8) is to 
have one 'tense operator' for each NP, in addition to the tense operator associated 
with the verb. She also notices, however, that the 'tense operators' associated with 
NPs should always take narrow scope. In ( 19), for example, although we want a 
past operator for every hostage, since these individuals may have been hostages 
in the past, we do not want that operator to take scope over the verb, since the 
sentence does not have a reading in which the meeting occurred at some time in 
the past. 
( 19) John will meet every hostage at the president's party. 
En9 concludes that what we need is to associate a temporal interval with each 
predicate, whose value is fixed by context; this temporal interval specifies the time 
at which the predicate has to be evaluated. 
En9'S proposal has been adopted in Situation Theory (see especially [Gawron 
and Peters, 1 990; Cooper, 1993]) ,  where, however, each predicate is indexed with 
a situation rather than with a time interval, as in asleeps(x). A variant of this 
notation is also used by Heim in [ 1990] . But if we assume that each predicate 
has this extra argument, we can also use it indicate the domain of quantification: 
in ( 1 6) ,  for example, the set of individuals that are asleep is the set of individuals 
contained in the particular situation that the speaker has in mind. According to this 
' situational' way of representing domain selection, the task of the listener upon 
hearing a strong quantified NP is not to select a set, but select a situation. Since 
this situation has to be identified, the representation of the head noun at Logical 
Form will contain a parameter as its situational index. This results in the following 
LF representation for ( 1 6) :  
(20) [ [every x persons(x)] [asleeps Cx)] ]  
If  we generalize the notion of ' strong LF constituent' to  include not only 
a constituent whose representation includes a parameter, but more in general 
any constituent whose interpretation depends on the value of a parameter, such 
as a variable left in place by Quantifier Raising, we correctly predict that LF 
configurations such as (2 1) ,  the LF analysis of There is every student in the garden, 
are ruled out.4 
(2 1 )  [ [every x students(x)] [there x in-the-garden]] 
The difference between strong quantified NPs and the non-presuppositional reading 
of weak NPs, in de Jong and Zucchi's analysis, is that the former presuppose the 
existence of a set, whereas the latter assert that existence; in other words, only 
strong quantified NPs require a domain restriction. I propose that this difference 
is captured at LF in this way: the representation of strong quantified NPs differs 
from that of weak quantified NPs in that the situational argument of the former is 
a parameter, whereas the situational argument of the latter is a variable that may 
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be either existentially bound or may be bound by some unselective operator. The 
LF representation of the non-specific reading of Someone is asleep is then:5 
(22) [persons(x) /\ asleep.(x)] 
An apparently minor, but in fact crucial aspect of the representation in (22) is the 
assumption that the situational argument of weak NPs in their non-presuppositional 
reading is the same as the situational argument of the main predicate, asleep. 
This assumption about the 'non-raised' interpretation of weak NPs was already 
adopted by Heim [ I990] . Heim makes this assumption, without discussing it, when 
reformulating the DRTsemantics for sentences containing adverbs of quantification 
such as (23). 
(23) If a man is from Athens, he (always) likes ouzo. 
In that paper, Heim treats adverbs of quantification such as always are quantifiers 
over situations (as proposed by, e.g., [de Swart, 1991 ]) instead of quantifiers 
over assignments as in [Heim, 1982] . The truth conditions of this sentence are 
paraphrased by Heim as follows: For every (minimal) situation s in which there is 
a man who is from Athens, there is an extended situation s' such that the unique 
man from Athens in s likes ouzo in s' . The point is that the sentence does not 
have a reading in which the indefinite is interpreted non-specifically, yet the man 
is part of a situation and he is from Athens in another situation. In fact, I am going 
to propose that the absence of this reading reflects a fundamental constraint on 
interpretation, that can be expressed as the following LF constraint: 
Constraint on Situation Identity Let [pix) /\ . . .  /\ q.' (y)] be an LF clause, i.e. , 
a conjunction of constituents that have 'the same level of embedding' at LF 
after Quantifier Raising. Then if P.(x) and q.' (y) are two conditions in that 
clause, s = s' . 
According to this constraint, the Logical Form that results by raising all operators 
must be such that all predicates that 'end up in the same place at LF, as it where, 
must have the same situational index: i.e., they must all be predicates about the 
same situation. 
Proper names like Chomsky or France are also presuppositional-the proper 
name Chomsky may only be used felicitously when the context provides an ap­
propriate referent-and strong, as indicated by the ungrammaticality of ? ?There 
is Chomsky in the garden. I propose that the LF representation of the proper 
name Chomsky consists of a parameter X, together with the presupposition that 
the referent of the parameter is called 'Chomsky' ;  this latter presupposition can 
be expressed in terms of parameters as a requirement that the context provide a 
situation S in which X is called 'Chomsky' .6 There is Chomsky in the garden 
thus has the following LF characterization, that is ruled out by the Definiteness 
Restriction formulated above: 
(24) [[there X in-the-garden] /\ Chomskys(X)] ,  where X and S are parameters. 
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There is one last aspect of the use of parameters to capture presuppositionality that 
needs to be discussed before proceeding to the semantics of definite descriptions. 
Consider the following example: 
(25) John thinks that there is a picture of himself in the museum. 
Since the reflexive pronoun himself is anaphoric, it should be represented as a 
parameter. We would the predict that (25) is bad, but in fact it is grammatical. 
Why is that? Note that the explanation can't simply be structural, since (26) is 
still bad: 
(26) ?*There is a picture of him in the museum. 
An important property of parameters in Situation Theory is that they can be 
anchored, i .e. ,  their value can be set equal to some file card index; an anchored 
parameter can be replaced by its non-parametric value. Oearly, if a parameter gets 
anchored at LF already, context doesn't need to provide a value for that parameter, 
which therefore counts as a non-parametric sentence constituent. I am going to 
propose that the reason why (25) is good is because himself is anchored in the LF 
representation for (25). 
4 A Parametric Semantics for Definite Descriptions 
According to Heim, the interpretation of a definite like the student imposes two 
constraints on the context. The context has to (i) provide an index for the definite, 
and (ii) presuppose that the value assigned to that index satisfies the restriction 
specified by the head noun, i.e. , that that object has the property of being a student. 
As far as the first of these constraints is concemed, Heim's theory can be 
refomulated in terms of parameters by assuming that the LF representation for a 
definite contains a parameter, as follows: 
(27) the student � [student(D)] 
Because of the Condition on Parametric LFs discussed in §3, having a parameter D 
in (27) is equivalent to Heim's requirement that the index assigned to the definite 
has to be that of an existing file card. The condition that context must presuppose 
that the referent of the definite is a student can be modeled by augmenting the 
predicate with a situational argument and letting this argument be a parameter S, 
as I proposed to do for other strong NPs in §3:7 
(28) the student � [students(D)] 
However, the translation in (28) is not general enough to cover all classes of 
definites, and in particular, it is not adequate to deal with a class of definites 
that are both very common and very closely related to weak definites. Heim 
notices in chapter 3 of her dissertation that while her proposal is appropriate for 
anaphoric and deictic definites, these are just two of the known ways to use definite 
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descriptions. Among the forms of definite descriptions use that are left out is one 
of the most common uses of definite descriptions, the so-called bridging de finites 
[Clark, 1977] or associative definites [Hawkins, 1978] . This class of definites is 
illustrated by the examples in (29) . 
(29) a. We went to a wedding last Sunday. The bride wore red. 
b. This year's biggest attempted hostile raid in the U.S., Paramount 
Communications Inc.'s failed $ 10.7 billion bid for Time Inc. ,  relied 
solely on bank loans for financing the initial offer. 
In (29b), for example, the antecedent for the definite description the initial offer 
has not been explicitly introduced in the discourse. The use of that definite is 
felicitous because it is possible for the listener to establish a connection ( 'bridge ' )  
between the definite and the index in  the file card set assigned to  Paramount Inc.'s 
hostile takeover attempt. 
Heim U 982] suggests that what Clark called 'bridging' is an example of what 
Lewis called accomodation [Lewis, 1 979] : in order to interpret the sentences in 
(29), something has to be added to ( 'accomodated into ' )  the context. The problem 
is how to impose constraints on accomodation so as to avoid incorrect predictions, 
for consider the sentences in (30) : 
(30) a. A car passed roaring. The radiator cap was shiny. 
b. A car passed roaring. ??The dog was barking. 
While (30a) is felicitous-it is easy to establish a connection between the radiator 
cap and the car- (30b) is infelicitous, even though one can easily concoct some 
story about the relation between the dog and the car- say, the dog is in the back 
seat of the car. 
An account of the conditions under which bridging reference is possible was 
given by Barker [Barker, 199 1 ;  Barker, 1992] . Barker's analysis is based on a 
distinction between lexical possessives and extrinsic possessives. Examples of 
lexical possessives are given in (3 1 ) ;  examples of extrinsic possessives are in 
(32) . According to Barker, what distinguishes the possessives in (3 1 )  from the 
possessives in (32) is that all the nouns in (3 1 )  have a two-place relation as one of 
their lexical meanings. 
(3 1 )  a. John's child (Kinship relations) 
b. John's nose, the table's  top (Part/whole relations) 
(32) a. John's cat 
b. John's truck 
Barker proposes that two conditions have to be satisfied in order for bridging 
references to be felicitous ([Barker, 1 99 1 ] , p. 142- 143). First of all, the head 
noun of the bridging definite must include among its lexical entries a relational 
meaning. Secondly, this relational meaning must be salient in context. Thus, 
according to Barker, (30a) is felicitous because the head noun radiator cap may 
Weak Definites 
have a relational interpretation and this relational interpretation is made salient by 
the mention of a car, whereas (30b) is infelicitous because the head noun dog does 
not have such a relational meaning. 
The relevance of associative definites to the topic of this paper is shown by the 
following variant of (30) : 
(33) a. A car passed roaring. The radiator cap of the car was shiny. 
b. A car passed roaring. ??The dog of the car was barking. 
As these examples indicate, there is a connection between the class of definites that 
give rise to the weak definite interpretation and the cases of bridging reference. 
Intuitively, the connection is as follows. Both definite NPs of the form the radiator 
cap of the car and associative definites require the head noun to have a relational 
interpretation. In the case of weak definites, however, the speaker makes it clear 
that the relational interpretation of the head noun has to used, whereas in the case 
of bridging references, the relational interpretation has to be salient enough that the 
listener may recognize that that indeed is the required interpretation. Thus, in the 
case of weak definites, the condition on the saliency of the relational interpretation 
is 'waived' . 
Clearly, formulating a semantics for definite descriptions that accounts for the 
associative use as well is going to be an important part of an account of weak 
definites. In order to give a uniform treatment both to anaphoric definites (in the 
larger sense), that denote the same object as a previous file card, and to associative 
definites, that denote an object that is not the value of an existing index, although it 
is related to the value of a file card in the current set, it seems necessary to require 
both definites and indefinites to introduce a new file card. We can then reinterpret 
the Familiarity Condition as stating that the LF representation of definites must 
contain a parameter to be equated to an existing index. In the case of a non­
relational definite such as the dog, or of the non-relational interpretation of a 
definite such as the student, the new index and the parameter must denote the same 
object: 
(34) the student "'-+ [dogs(x) 1\ x = D] 
The difference between (34) and (28) is that a new file card index x is introduced 
in (34) , but x is required to have the same value as an existing file card index D; 
(34) is  thus equivalent to (27) . 
In the case of the relational interpretation of the definite descriptions the student 
or the radiator cap, however, the file card introduced for the definite does not have 
the same denotation of the parameter: the LF representation is shown below. 
(35) the student "'-+ [students(x,D)] 
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5 The Solution: Parameter Anchoring 
My proposal concerning the weak definites puzzle is that the properties of weak 
definites are due to the fact that in these constructions the head noun receives a 
relational translation of the kind shown in (35), and because of this, the parame­
ters in the interpretation of the definite get anchored at LF, thus 'canceling' the 
presupposition much as in the case of John thinks that there is a picture oj himself 
in the museum that I discussed in §3 .  The interpretation in which parameters are 
anchored does not impose on the context the constraint of providing a suitable 
referent, which explains why no familiarity is required, which in turns eliminates 
the requirement for uniqueness, if we accept Heim's reduction of uniqueness to 
familiarity; it also allows the definite NP to pass the Definiteness Restriction test. 
The contrast between a definite NP of the form [NPI the N 1 ojNP2[ -definite] ] , 
whose parameters get anchored at LF, and the definites in (6)-for example, a 
definite NP of the form [NPI the N 1 with NP2[ -definite]]- whose parameters are 
not, is caused, I propose, by the semantic difference between the two complements 
ojNP2[-definite] and with NP2[-definite] .  Barker [Barker, 1 99 1 ] and Jackendoff 
[Jackendoff, 1977] argue that of-NPs specify an argument of the predicate denoted 
by the head of the noun phrase, whereas other postnominal modifiers-e.g., other 
PPs, or relative clauses-specify adjuncts of that predicate. In other words, the 
LF representation of (4a), shown in (36b), is similar to (35), whereas the LF 
representation of (6c), shown in (36d), is similar to (34). 
(36) a. John got these data from the student of a linguist. 
b. [linguists(x) 1\ students(Y,x) 1\ Johns' (Z) 1\ got-froms( Z,these-data,y)] 
c. John got these data from the student with a brown jacket. 
d. [brown-jackets(x) 1\ students(y) 1\ y = D 1\ withs(y,x) 1\ Johns' (Z) 1\ 
got-fromsC Z,these-data,y)] 
As discussed in §4, nouns like student have (at least) two lexical entries, according 
to Barker: one of the entries is the two place relation students(y,x), the other the 
property students(y) . The selection of one or the other interpretation is left to the 
context in case of associative descriptions, hence the necessity for the 'relational' 
interpretation to be salient. In the case of NPs whose head noun has an oj-clause 
as a complement, the relational interpretation is preferred (as in (36b)) ;  other 
complements instead suggest that the other interpretation has to be used (as in 
in (36d)). The crucial importance of the fact that the complement NP serves as 
argument for the relational noun receives further confirmation by the examination 
of NPs that although of the form [NPI the Nl  ojNP2[-definite] ]  are nevertheless 
infelicitous as weak definites: 
(37) a. ??I found this money behind the brick of a wall. 
b. ??I don't want to steal the book of a library. 
Neither brick in (37a) and book in (37b) can be interpreted as relational, hence the 
definites are infelicitous. 
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The important difference between (36b) and (36d) is that (36d) still contains 
a parameter D indicating that the antecedent has to be identified, whereas the 
connection between the referent of the definite and the context is already establis­
hed in (36b) : the parameter D in (35) is anchored to the index x of the second 
argument of the relational noun. To put this otherwise, the sentence itself asserts 
the existence of a value for D in the context, namely, x; by equating D to x at LF, 
the presupposition has been 'canceled' . 
The presupposition only gets 'canceled,' however, when the second argument 
of the relation is not itself a parameter, or a variable whose value depends on the 
value of a parameter, as in the student of Chomsky or the student of every linguist. 
Consider the LF translations of the sentences John got these data from the student 
of Chomsky and John got these data from the student of every linguist: 
(38) a. John got these data from the student of Chomsky. 
b. [Johns(Z) /\ students'(Y,x) /\ Chomsky s', (X) /\ got-fromsC Z,these­
data,y)] 
c. John got these data from the student of every linguist. 
d. [ [every x linguists(x)] [Johns' (Z) /\ students" (Y,x) /\ got-froms( 
Z,these-data,y) ] ]  
In  (38b), the second argument of the relation students'(Y,x) i s  the parameter X, 
therefore the LF representation of the definite is still presuppositional. In (38b), 
the second argument is the variable x, that is bound by the raised quantifier [every 
x linguists(x)] whose value depends on the value of the parameter S, and therefore 
again the LF representation of the definite is presuppositional. 
This last assertion will certainly result in the objection that if [every x 
linguists(x)] counts as presuppositional because of S, then surely students(Y,x) 
in (36b) should count as presuppositional as well. This is correct; however, we can 
now exploit the constraint on LF that I called Constraint on Situation Identity in §3. 
According to this constraint, motivated by facts about adverbs of quantification, 
all predicates that remain in the same position at LF after Quantifier Raising must 
be describing the same situation, i.e., all of their situational indices must be the 
same. If we enforce this constraint on (36b) we get the Logical Form in (39a), 
which is equivalent to the Logical Form in (39b); this should be compared with 
the LF representation for John got these data from the student of Chomsky, whose 
representation is shown in (39c). Notice that the representation of the definite 
comes out 'parameterless' in (39b) , but presuppositional in (39c) . 
(39) a. [Johns' (Z) /\ students(y,x) /\ linguistsCx) /\ S = s  /\ S' = s  /\ got-froms( 
Z,these-data,y) ] 
b. [Johns(Z) /\ students(y,x) /\ linguists(x) /\ got-froms( Z,these-data,y)] 
c.  [JohnsCz) /\ students(y,x) /\ Chomskys(X) /\ got-froms( Z,these­
data,y)] 
At this point, it should also be clear why the force of weak definites depends on the 
force of their arguments. By assigning to the student of a linguist the translation in 
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(39b), the theory I have presented predicts that an un selective operator binding the 
variable x introduced by the complement NP a linguist will necessarily bind the 
variable y introduced by the definite. If we assume with Kadmon and Landman 
that any-NPs are like indefinites, and therefore presumably are assigned their 
quantificational force by an unselective operator, we also predict that the definite 
the student of any linguist will be bound by whatever operator binds the NP any 
linguist, which explains the facts in (9) . 
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Notes 
I There is one class of NPs that behave like weak definites, and these are 
possessive descriptions [Barker, 199 1 1  of the form [NPI [NP2 D N2] 's NI] ,  where 
NP2 is indefinite. These NPs have no familiarity/uniqueness presuppositions, as 
shown in (40), and are not subject to the Definiteness Restriction, as shown in 
(4 1 ) .  
(40) John got these data from a linguist's student. 
(4 1 )  There i s  a linguist's student in the garden. 
Although in principle it should be possible to extend the treatment discussed below 
to possessive descriptions, some problems are still open. 
2These examples represent a further problem for the Russellian approach: even 
if domain selection could be invoked for sentences like (4a), it's not at all clear 
how the preferred reading of (9a) could be obtained. 
3My proposal can be formulated in a purely model-theoretical fashion, but this 
would require introducing a considerable amount of material unrelated to the main 
topic of this paper. A treatment of this type is presented in [Poesio, 1 994] . 
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4The hypothesis that what determines the acceptability of a sentence like (2 1 )  
i s  not the occurrence of a variable in post-verbal position, but the status o f  the 
raised NP, is supported by the contrast reported by Heim [ 1987] between the 
acceptability of (42a), in which the variable that presumably translates the trace is 
bound by the weak NP how many, and the unacceptability of (42b) , in which the 
variable is bound by the strong NP which one of the two men. 
(42) a. How many soldiers were there in the infirmary? 
b. ??Which one of the two men was there in the infirmary? 
5The presuppositional interpretation of a weak NP-for example, the specific 
reading of an indefinite NP-results instead in a parametric LF, which is strong. 
One can think of this proposal as an alternative to En� 's [ 1 99 1 ] , where instead of 
having two indices per NP, one has an LF constituent denoting the referent of the 
NP and an LF constituent denoting the situation of which that referent is a part. 
6This translation is neutral with respect to the question of whether proper names 
are to be interpreted attributively or referentially. The interpretation depends on the 
value specified for X; thus, one can force a referential interpretation by requiring 
the value of X to be a constant. 
7Reformulated in this way, Heim's theory becomes very similar to Hawkins' 
' location theory' of definite descriptions, according to which the task of the listener 
upon hearing a definite description is to (i) identify the situation of which the 
referent is a part, and (ii) identify the referent of the definite within that situation 
[Hawkins, 1978] . 
References 
[Barker, 1 99 1 ] Barker, C. 199 1 .  Possessive Descriptions. Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA. 
[Barker, 1992] Barker, C. 1992. Definite possessives and discourse novelty. In 
Proc. ofCLS-92. 
[Barwise and Cooper, 1981 ] Barwise, J. and Cooper, R. 1 98 1 .  Generalized quan­
tifiers and natural language. Linguistics and Philosophy 4(2) : 1 59-2 19 .  
[Barwise and Perry, 1983] Barwise, J .  and Perry, J .  1983. Situations and Attitudes. 
The MIT Press. 
[Clark, 1977] Clark, H. H. 1977. Bridging. In Johnson-Laird, P. N. and Wa­
son, P.c., editors 1977, Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science. Cambridge 
University Press, London and New York. 
297 
298 Massimo Poesio 
[Cooper, 1993] Cooper, R. 1993. Generalised quantifiers and resource situations. 
In Aczel, P. ; Israel, D.; Katagiri, Y.; and Peters, S . ,  editors 1 993, Situation 
Theory and its Applications, v.3. CSLI and University of Chicago, Stanford. 
chapter 8, 19 1-2 12. 
[de long, 1 987] long, F.de 1 987. The compositional nature of (in)definiteness. In 
Reuland, E. l. and Meulen, A G. B .ter, editors 1 987, The Representation of 
(In)definiteness. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. chapter 1 1 , 270--285. 
[de Swart, 199 1 ] Swart, H.de 199 1 .  Adverbs of quantification : a generalized 
quantifier approach. Ph.D. Dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 
[Dowty, 1979] Dowty, D. R. 1 979. Word Meaning and Montague Grammar. D. 
Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland. 
[En<;, 1986] En<;, M. 1 986. Towards a referential analysis of temporal expressions. 
Linguistics and Philosophy 9(4):405-426. 
[En<;, 1 99 1 ] En<;, M. 199 1 .  The semantics of specificity. Linguistic Inquiry 
22( 1 ) : 1-25. 
[Gawron and Peters, 1 990] Gawron, l. M. and Peters, S .  1990. Anaphora and 
Quantification in Situation Semantics, volume 1 9  of Lecture Notes. CSLI. 
[Gazdar, 1979] Gazdar, G. 1979. Pragmatics. Academic Press, New York. 
[Hawkins, 1 978] Hawkins, 1. A 1978. Definiteness and Indefiniteness. Croom 
Helm, London. 
[Heim, 1982] Heim, I. 1 982. The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun 
Phrases. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
[Heim, 1983] Heim, I. 1983. On the projection problem for presuppositions. In 
Proc. WCFFL II, Stanford, CA 
[Heim, 1987] Heim, I. 1987. Where does the definiteness restriction apply? 
In Meulen, Ater and Reuland, E., editors 1 987, The Representation of 
(In)definitess. MIT Press. 
[Heim, 1990] Heim, I. 1990. E-type pronouns and donkey anaphora. Linguistics 
and Philosophy 1 3(2) : 1 37-138. 
[Hinrichs, 1 988] Hinrichs, E. 1 988. Tense, quantifiers, and contexts. Computa­
tional Linguistics 14(2) :3-14. 
[Jackendoff, 1977] lackendoff, R. 1 977. X-bar Syntax. The MIT Press, Cam­
bridge, MA 
Weak Definites 
[Kadmon and Landman, 1993] Kadmon, N. and Landman, F. 1993. Any. Lingui­
stics and Philosophy 16(4) :353-422. 
[Kadmon, 1987] Kadmon, N. 1 987. On Unique and Non-Unique Reference and 
Asymmetric Quantification. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst. 
[Lewis, 1 979] Lewis, D. K. 1979. Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of 
Philosophical Logic 8:339-359. 
[May, 1 985] May, R. 1985. Logical Form in Natural Language. The MIT Press. 
[Milsark, 1 977] Milsark, G. 1977. Towards an explanation of certain peculiarities 
in the existential construction in english. Linguistic Analysis 3: 1-30. 
[Neale, 1 990] Neale, S. 1990. Descriptions. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
[Partee, 1 99 1 ] Partee, B. H. 199 1 .  Topic, focus and quantification. In Proc. 
SALT-91 . 
[Poesio, 1 994] Poesio, M. 1994. Discourse Interpretation and the Scope of Ope­
rators. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Rochester, Department of Computer 
Science, Rochester, NY. 
[Reuland and ter Meulen, 1987] Reuland, E. J. and Meulen, A. G. B.ter, editors 
1 987. The Representation of (In)definiteness. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
[Rooth, 1 992] Rooth, M. 1 992. A theory of focus interpretation. Natural Langu­
age Semantics 1 :75-1 16. 
[Russell, 1 905] Russell, B. 1905. On denoting. Mind 14:479-493. Reprinted in 
Logic and Knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
[van der Sandt, 1990] Sandt, R. A.van der 1990. Anaphora and accomodation. 
Workshop on Quantification and Anaphora, Second European Summer School 
in Language, Logic and Information. 
[Zucchi, 1 993] Zucchi, A. 1993. The ingredients of definiteness and the defini­
teness effect. Natural Language Semantics. To appear. 
.. 
299 
